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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
September 24, 1984 Conference
Summer List 17, Sheet 2
I

No. 83-2148
STATE OF OREGON,
DEPT OF FISH & WILDLIFE,

~ dt-

Cert to CA9 (Kilkenny,
Wallace, Canby)

v.
KLAMATH INDIAN TRIBE

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petr argues that the CA9 erred in holding that

hunting and fishing rights of resp's members in certain
reservation lands survived resp's cession of those lands.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

Under the terms of a treaty

signed in 1864, the Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin

acres of land in Oregon, California, and Nevada.

They received

in return a reservation of some 1.9 million acres located
entirely within the state of Oregon.

The treaty guaranteed the

tribes "the exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and
lakes, included in said reservation, and of gathering edible
roots, seeds, and berries within its limits." 1
The United States commissioned surveys of the reservation
lands in 1871 and 1888.

These surveys erroneously excluded large

tracts of land from the Klamath reservation.

In 1896, the United

States responded to complaints from tribal members by appointing
a boundary commission to determine whether an error had in fact
occurred.

The commission concluded that over 621,000 acres had

been excluded and that the value of the land, based on the
quality of its soil and timber, its suitability for grazing, and
the quantity of rock formations (but not its suitability for
hunting and fishing), was 86.36¢ per acre.

Based on the

commission's report, the government negotiated an agreement with
the Indians under which the tribes would "cede, surrender, grant
and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title,
and interest" to the excluded lands in return for the payment of
$537,007.07. 2

The agreement also provided that "nothing in this

1 Although the treaty mentioned only fishing and gathering
rights, the parties are in agreement that the Indians' rights in
the treaty lands included rights to hunt and trap as well as fish
and gather.
2 In 1969, the tribes received an additional $4 million based on
the Indian Claims Commission's determination that the
consideration for the agreement had been unconscionable.

-3-

agreement shall be construed to deprive the said Klamath and
other Indians of any benefits to which they are entitled under
existing treaties, not inconsistent with the provisions of this
agreement."

The agreement did not explicitly mention hunting or

fishing rights.
Following the ratification of the cession agreement in 1906,
tribal members continued to exercise their rights to hunt, fish,
and trap on the ceded lands free from regulation by the state.
In March, 1982, the Klamath Tribe brought this action in the D.
Ore. to enjoin the State of Oregon from interfering with the
exercise of those rights.

The tribe asserted that far from

abrogating the Indians' hunting and fishing rights in the ceded
lands, the agreement specifically preserved those rights by
specifying that the tribe retained all treaty rights not
inconsistent with the agreement.

The state responded that the

hunting and fishing rights recognized by the 1864 treaty attached
to reservation lands; when the tribes renounced all claim to the
lands in the 1901 agreement, the lands were removed from the
reservation and the Indians therefore lost their right to hunt
and fish on those lands free from state regulation.
Relying principally on the doctrine that treaties are to be
construed favorably to Indian tribes and on Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391

u.s.

404 (1968), which held that an Indian

tribe retained its hunting and fishing rights in former
reservation lands even after the termination of the reservation,
the district court held that the cession agreement did not affect
the tribes' hunting and fishing rights.

The court also noted

-4that neither the boundary commission that originally set the
value of the land nor the Indian Claims Commission that
subsequently awarded the tribes $4 million in additional
compensation, considered the value of the hunting and fishing
rights in determining the value of the ceded land.

The court

took the failure to compensate the tribes for these rights as an
indication of an intent not to extinguish them.

Moreover, the

court rejected the state's argument that the retention of hunting
and fishing rights was inconsistent with the cession of title to
the federal government.

The CA9 affirmed based on substantially

identical reasoning.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that this Court's precedents

reveal that special rights held by Indians in reservation lands
are extinguished when those lands are removed from the
reservation, and Indian activities on such lands become subject
to state regulation.

Petr distinguishes this Court's holding in

Menominee Tribe, supra, on the grounds that the Menominee Tribe
retained its lands after the termination of the tribe's formal
relationship with the federal government (which entailed
termination of the "reservation" status of tribal lands).

Here,

by contrast, the Klamaths ceded their lands to the federal
government altogether.

The clause in the agreement reserving to

the Klamaths all treaty rights not inconsistent with the
agreement is of no avail to the tribe in this controversy, for
the retention of hunting and fishing rights is inconsistent with
the tribe's renunciation of all its "claim, right, title, and
interest" in the ceded lands.

-5-

Petr also asserts that the CA9's decision is in conflict
with the CAS's resolution of a substantially similar case.

In

Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161
(CA8 1980), that court affirmed a district court's ruling that
tribal rights to fish and hunt free from state regulation in
lands removed from reservation boundaries were extinguished
absent specific congressional recognition of such rights.

Petr

argues that this Court should grant cert to resolve the conflict.
Resp replies that Menominee Tribe and its progeny, which
include CA9 decisions holding that members of the tribes involved
in this litigation retain hunting and fishing rights in
reservation lands terminated in 1954, are in fact controlling.
Indeed, this is an easier case for the Indians than Menominee
Tribe and its progeny, for those cases recognized that unless
Congress specifically provided otherwise, tribal rights continued
even after the reservation (and the tribe itself) was terminated
altogether; here, the reservation was merely diminished, and "if
tribal hunting and fishing rights survive termination,
fortiori, they survive diminishment."

~

(Resp. Br. at 8.)

Resp also denies that there is a split in the circuits.

The

CA9's opinion is on all fours with both a decision of the CA7
and, significantly, with a CA8 decision that postdates Red Lake
Band.

See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809

(CA8 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 707 (1984).

Moreover, Red

Lake Band is distinguishable in that it involved not the
retention of the right to hunt and fish free from state
regulation in lands ceded to the federal government, but the very

-6different question of the right to enter privately held lands to
hunt and fish.

The Klamath Tribe does not attempt to assert any

rights against private landowners; indeed, 99% of the lands at
issue in this case remain in federal hands.
4.

DISCUSSION % RECOMMENDATION:

On the most basic level of

analysis, the decision below seems somewhat odd.

The 1864 treaty

guaranteed the Tribe hunting and fishing rights "within
reservation's] limits."

[the

The parties do not dispute that the

cession agreement removed the ceded lands from the reservation's
limits, and the agreement explicitly states that the tribe
relinquishes all its rights and interests in the ceded territory.
Similar language has been held by this Court to be sufficient to
diminish a reservation and subject the ceded territory to state
regulation.

See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430

(1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420

u.s.

u.s.

584

425 (1975).

It is tempting to conclude that the cession agreement on its face
abrogated the tribe's hunting and fishing rights in the ceded
land.
However, hunting and fishing rights are not necessarily
appurtenant only to

~eservation

lands, see Lac Courte Oreilles

Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341
(CA7), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983), and the tribe's
argument that Menominee Tribe supports the decision below has
considerable force.

Even so, I'm not entirely convinced by

resp's argument (accepted by the CA9) that Menominee Tribe is
controlling in this case.

Resp contends that if hunting and

fishing rights survive termination of a reservation, they must

-7-

-·

survive mere diminishment of the reservatipn.

Although this

syllogism has some appeal, it neglects that termination of a
reservation as effected by the Menominee Termination Act and
similar legislation does not entail the extinguishment of a
tribe's right to its land, but rather the conveyance of
reservation lands to a tribal corporation. 3

Termination is

primarily an adjustment in the tribe's relationship with the
federal government rather than an abandonment of treaty rights.
By contrast, the agreement between the Klamaths and the United
States involved the relinquishment of all the tribe's claim to
the lands involved.
Moreover, resp fails to mention that the outcome in
Menominee Tribe was heavily dependent on the language of 18

u.s.c.

§1162, which was passed by the same Congress that passed

the Menominee Termination Act.

§1162 provided that certain

states (including Wisconsin and Oregon} could exercise general
jurisdiction over "Indian country" within their borders.
However, the statute also stated that "nothing in this section
••• shall deprive any ••• Indian tribe •.. of any right,
privilege, or

immun~ty

afforded under Federal treaty, agreement

3 Termination may also involve the selling of some reservation
lands and the distribution of the proceeds of the sale to tribal
members who wish to end their formal affiliation with the tribe.
Some lower courts have held that Menominee Tribe indicates that
members of a terminated tribe retain hunting and fishing rights
even in lands that have been sold during the termination process.
See Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (CA9 1974} (holding that
Klamaths retain hunt1ng and fishing rights in reservation lands
sold pursuant to termination}; Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768
(CA9 1979} (same}.

-sor statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing

"

The Court concluded that §1162 must be considered in pari materia
with the Menominee Termination Act, and that, so considered, it
called for the preservation of hunting and fishing rights in all
lands that were "Indian country" in 1954 notwithstanding the
termination of their reservation status pursuant to the
contemporaneously enacted Menominee Termination Act.

u.s.,

at 410-411.

See 391

Although §1162 also applies to "Indian

country" in Oregon, it would not seem to mandate preservation of
hunting and fishing rights in the lands at issue in this case,
since (1) the statute ratifying the cession agreement in this
case was passed roughly 50 years beore §1162 and therefore need
not be considered in pari materia with §1162, and (2) the ceded
lands were no longer "Indian country" when §1162 was passed.
Given the inapplicability of §1162, a strong argument can be made
that the controlling precedent in this case is not Menominee
Tribe, but DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra, which held
that the state of South Dakota had jurisdiction over lands ceded
to the federal government by the Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux.
Resp is also simply wrong in asserting that Lower Brule
Sioux Tribe indicates that the CAS is not in conflict with the
CA9.

In fact, Lower Brule Sioux supports petr's position, not

resp's.

Lower Brule Sioux involved the question whether the

Sioux retained their hunting and fishing rights in portions of
their reservation taken by the federal government and inundated
by dams built on the Missouri River.

Although the CAS held that

the tribe did retain its fishing and hunting rights, this holding

-9-

was grounded on the court's finding that the acts of Congress
taking the Indian lands for use in the reservoir projects (unlike
the cession agreement between the Klamaths and the government in
this case) did not remove the lands from the reservation.
Indeed, the court stated that "(i]f either Act disestablished the
reservation boundaries, the application of state law on the land
taken by that Act no longer would be preempted, and South Dakota
would have jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by tribal
members on that land absent federal law preserving the Indians'
treaty hunting and fishing rights."

711 F.2d, at 811. 4

Resp's attempt to explain away the conflict between the
decision below and the CAB's ruling in Red Lake Band is equally
flawed.

Although the lands in question in Red Lake Band were in

private hands to a much greater extent than the lands in this
case, the court did not merely rule that the tribe had lost its
rights to enter private property when it ceded its land; rather,
it held that the tribe had lost its hunting, fishing and
gathering rights irrespective of whether exercise of those rights
would entail entry on private property.

The only possible

4 Lac Courte Oreilles, supra, also relied on by resp as support
for the notion that hunting and fishing rights survive cession of
reservation lands, is similarly distinguishable. Lac Courte
Oreilles involved the question whether rights explicitly retained
by the tribe in lands ceded in 1837 and 1842 were extinguished by
an 1854 treaty that did not explicitly reserve those rights (and,
indeed, did not even mention the lands the lands ceded in 1837
and 1842). Here, by contrast, the rights retained in the 1864
treaty were rights in reservation lands, and the cession
agreement explicitly stated that the tribe gave up all its rights
in those lands.

-10distinction between this case and Red Lake Band is that the
purpose of the cession agreement in Red Lake Band was at least in
part to open up lands to white settlement, whereas the ceded
lands in this case have remained almost entirely under federal
control.

Arguably, preservation of tribal hunting and fishing

rights is inconsistent with white settlement but consistent with
federal land management.

However, given that the government's

intent to open the land to settlement seems to have figured only
slightly in the Red Lake Band court's reasoning, that case is
fairly read as being in conflict with the CA9's decision in this
case.
The question involved in this case is of some importance.
The decision of the court below deprives the State of Oregon of
the power to enforce its game laws against resp's members in a
621,000 acre area.

As a matter of logic, the opinion also would

suggest that resp tribe has exclusive fishing (and perhaps
hunting) rights in that area, since the 1864 agreement, which is
the basis of the rights asserted, guaranteed the tribe exclusive
rights.

(The tribe

~oes

not, however, claim exclusive rights.)

The issue may also have importance beyond the boundaries of the
ceded Klamath lands: presumably, other tribes have also ceded
lands in which they once possessed hunting and fishing rights,
and the CA9's reasoning calls into question the validity of state
fish and game regulation in all such territories.

Given the

importance of the issue, the doubtfulness of some of the
precedential support for the holding below, and the conflict

-11between the CA9's ruling and the CAS's holding in Red Lake Band,
I would recommend that the petition for certiorari be granted.
There is a response.
August 9, 1984

Nelson

Opin in petn.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE v.
KLAMATWH INDIAN TRIBE
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 83-2148.

Decided October-, 1984

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
By a treaty with the United States signed in 1864, the
Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake
Indians ceded their claim to roughly twenty million acres of
land in southern Oregon and northern California. They received in return a reservation of some 1. 9 million acres located entirely within the State of Oregon. The treaty guaranteed the tribes "the exclusive right of taking fish in the
streams and lakes, included in said reservation, and of gathering edible roots, seeds, and berries within its limits."
Treaty between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc Tribes and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, Oct. 4, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 708 (1866). 1
Surveys of the Klamath reservation commissioned by the
United States in 1871 and 1888 erroneously excluded large
tracts of land from the reservation. In 1896, the United
States responded to complaints from tribal members by appointing a boundary commission to determine whether an
error had occurred and recommend an appropriate settlement. The commission ultimately concluded that 621,824
acres of Klamath land had been erroneously excluded and
that the value of the land, based on its rock formations, the
quality of its soil and timber, and its suitability for grazing,
was 86.36¢ per acre. This government then entered intonegotiations with representatives of the tribes, who eventually
' Although the treaty mentioned only fishing and gathering rights, the
parties agree that the treaty also reserved for the Indians the right to hunt
and trap on reservation land.
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agreed to "cede, surrender, grant and convey to the United
States all their claim, right, title, and interest" in the excluded lands in return for the payment of $537,007.07. 2 The
agreement, signed by the tribes on June 17, 1901 and ratified
by Congress in 1906, further provided that "nothing in this
agreement shall be construed to deprive said Klamath and
other Indians of any benefits to which they are entitled under
existing treaties, not inconsistent with the provisions of this
agreement." Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325,
367-368. The agreement made no mention of fishing or
hunting rights.
Between 1906 and 1982, the Klamaths evidently continued
to hunt, fish, and trap on the ceded lands with little regard
for the fish and game laws of the State of Oregon, and the
State took no active measures to stop them. In March of
1982, however, the Klamaths filed this lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon to enjoin
state officials from regulating hunting and fishing by tribal
members in the ceded lands. Ruling that the agreement of
1906 did not abrogate the Klamaths' hunting and fishing
rights in the ceded territory, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Klamaths. The State appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Klamath Indian
Tribe v. Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 729 F. 2d 609 (CA9
1984). The State then filed this timely petition for
certiorari.
The State's argument throughout this litigation has been
that the Klamaths gave up whatever hunting and fishing
rights they may have had in the lands at issue when they
ceded to the United States "all their claim, right, title, and
interest" therein. The courts below rejected this argument
on the grounds that the Klamaths' treaty-based hunting and
fishing rights were distinct from their title to the land, and
In 1969, the Indian Claims Commission determined that the consideration paid the Klamaths was inadequate and awarded them an additional
$4, 152,992.80.
.
2
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that the legislation ratifying the cession agreement not only
contained no language specifically extinguishing those rights,
but in fact provided that all rights not inconsistent with the
cession agreement were to be preserved. The courts also
found support in this Court's decision in Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968), which held that the Menominee Tribe retained hunting and fishing rights in its
treaty lands even after termination of their reservation status. Finally, both lower courts pointed out that in setting
the valuation of the land, the boundary commission had not
explicitly included in its calculations the value of the Indians'
hunting and fishing rights.
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Klamaths retained
their hunting and fishing rights when they ceded "all their
claim, right, title, and interest" in the 620,000 acres strikes
me as somewhat curious. The treaty of 1864 specified only
that the Klamath's had exclusive fishing and gathering rights
within their reservation; accordingly, the suggestion that
those rights survived the cession of reservation land and the
Klamaths' renunciation of all their rights in the ceded lands
is, on its face, dubious at best. The provision reserving all
rights "not inconsistent" with the terms of the agreement
provides only questionable support for the Ninth Circuit's
ruling: retention of rights is hardly consistent with their surrender. To be sure, this Court has consistently held that
treaties with Indian tribes are to be construed in favor of the
Indians and that the abrogation of treaty rights is not to be
lightly inferred, see Washington v. Washington Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U. S. 658, 676 (1979); but the language of the
cession agreement is not particularly ambiguous, and this
Court has held similar language sufficient to diminish reservation boundaries and extinguish tribal rights in ceded
lands. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584 (1977).
Standing alone, the cession agreement is not particularly supportive of the Ninth Circuit's position.

4
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Nor does this Court's decision in Menominee Tribe, supra,
dictate the result reached below. Menominee Tribe teaches
that hunting and fishing rights in tribal lands survive the termination of the trust relationship between tribe and federal
government and the consequent elimination of the "reservation" status of tribal lands. But a "terminated" tribe does
not surrender its lands, as the Klamaths did here; rather, the
tribe typically continues to manage its lands through a tribal
corporation or trust. That members of a terminated tribe
retain hunting and fishing rights in tribal lands has no direct
bearing on the question whether tribal hunting and fishing
rights are extinguished when a tribe cedes all its right, title,
and interest in a tract of land.
That the Ninth Circuit's analysis is not unassailable might
or might not be sufficient reason in itself to grant the State's
petition for certiorari. What makes this case particularly
worthy of this Court's attention, however, is that the Ninth
Circuit's analysis is at odds with that employed by the Eighth
Circuit in a similar case, Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F. 2d 1161 (CA8 1980), aff'g United
States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382 (D Minn 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U. S. 905 (1980). Red Lake Band involved the
question whether the hunting, fishing, and rice-gathering
rights of the Red Lake Chippewas survived their agreement
to "grant, cede, relinquish, and convey to the United States
all [their] right, title, and interest in and to" certain former
reservation lands. See 466 F. Supp., at 1384. Although the
treaty did not mention the Indians' hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's conclusion that the language of the cession agreement
"was 'precisely suited' for relinquishment of the very rights
the Band now claims it retained," id., at 1385, and that the
agreement thus sufficed to estinguish those rights in the
ceded lands. Significantly, the Red Lake Band courts rejected the argument, found compelling by the Ninth Circuit,
that. Menominee Tribe commanded a contrary result.

OREGON v. KLAMATH INDIAN TRIBE
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Of course, Red Lake Band involved the construction of different treaties and the consideration of a different historical
record from those at issue here. Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on Menominee Tribe and its holding that
general language ceding all rights in reservation land is insufficient to extinguish hunting and fishing rights amount to a
direct rejection of the analysis of the Red Lake Band courts.
The conflict between the Circuits is thus a substantial one.
The question presented by this case is one of some importance: the decision below deprives the State of Oregon of full
authority to enforce its fish and game laws in almost 1,000
square miles of its territory. The Ninth Circuit's decision at
least debatable, and the conflict between the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning and that of the Eighth Circuit on a question concerning Indian treaty rights-a subject in which this Court
has traditionally taken great interest-indicates a need for
guidance from this Court. I would grant the petition for
certiorari.
Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

/

~

lgs October 1, 1984-[1

~
~

·

~ 9 ~ ,,
~.,~
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Lynda
Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath

Re:
No. 83-2148
Indian Tribe

This case was originally scheduled for the September
24, 1984 Conference and was relisted for JUSTICE WHITE to dissent
from the Conference's vote to deny cert.
JUSTICE WHITE primarily reiterates the arguments for a

------

grant contained in the pool memo.

He finds a conflict between

CA9's interpretation of the treaty language here and CAB's
interpretation of similar language in another treaty in Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161 (CA8), cert.
denied, 449

u.s.

905 (1980).

He also

~agrees

with CA9's

conclusion that its result was dictated by Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391

u.s.

404 (1968), and argues that CA8 read
V\~

Menominee Tribe differently.
I recommend that you adhere to your previous vote,

~or

the same reasons I recommended initially that you vote to deny.
Red Lake Band involved the interpretation of a different treaty,
one that did not contain the express reservation of benefits
contained in the Klamath treaty.

CA9's opinion was not without

basis, and I am not convinced of the future importance of the
issue.
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Aoril 30 , 1985

83-2148 Oregon DPDartment v . Klamath Indian Tribe

Dear John:
Ple~e;e

ac!.:l at the enr'! of t"'le

ooinion tnnt I took no pnrt Jn
ot the abovP ca~~.

th~

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

lfn/ss

n~xt nratt of your
conei.leratio'l or Jeci.sio11

~u.prttttt

Qfourl of lift ~tb ~tzdts
._-ulfington. ~. <If. 2llc?~~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 1, 1985

Re:

83-2148 - Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife
v. Klamath Indian Tribe

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

..ilt.Jlftlltt ClfO'Uri .ttl tqt ~itth ..itzdt,S'

Jl a.tdtington, ~. cq.

2llt?~ &'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

May 1, 1985

No. 83-2148

Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife
v. Klamath Indian Tribe

Dear John,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

May 2, 1985

83-2148 - Oregon Department of Fish
and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe

Dear John,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 6, 1985

Re:

No. 83-2148-oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v.

Klamath Indian Tribe
Dear John:
In due course I hope to circulate a dissent in this one.

Sincerely,

~·
•
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

'Ihe Conference
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May 22, 1985

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 83-2148 - Or. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v.
Klamath Indian Tribe

Dear John:
I join.

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

June 24, 1985

No. 83-2148, Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife
v. Klamath Indian Tribe

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference
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BRENNAN, .JR.

June 24, 1985

No. 83-2148
Oregon Department of Fish
& Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

83-2148 Oregon Dept. of Fish & Klamath Indian Tribe (Annmarie)
LFP Out - letter 4/30/85
JPS for the Court 3/4/85
1st draft 4/30/85
2nd draft 5/29/85
Joined by WHR 5/l/85
soc 5/1/85
BRW 5/2/85
CJ 5/22/85
WJB 6/24/85
HAB 6/24/85
TM dissenting
1st draft 6/24/85
1st draft 6/25/85
TM will dissent 5/6/85

